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elitists and cracked eggheads in universities. What is obvious is that 
many people, including scholars, are polarized over the issues of 
gun control, crime control, and the strategies for achieving each. 
The greater the disagreements, the more strident the argu-
ments, the more likely it is that evidence, reason, and compromise 
will give way to slogans, hatreds, and ultimatums. What the Con-
stitution means is not only what the founders thought and wrote 
(history records the fact that slavery was once constitutional), but 
also what we today, after our best efforts to understand the aspira-
tions embodied in the document, make of it. The Constitution and 
its history constitute common ground, disputed but still shared by 
those who would limit and by those who would extend the right to 
keep and bear arms. 
That Every Man Be Armed challenges the constitutional inter-
pretation of gun prohibitionists. Halbrook's evidence cannot be ig-
nored, nor can his arguments be dismissed. Those who choose to go 
on believing prohibitionist pronouncements about the meaning of 
the second amendment will have to do so in spite of the facts. 
CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL LAWMAKING: 
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ART OF POLITICS. 
By Lief H. Carter. I New York: Pergamon Press. 1985. Pp. 
xviii, 216. Cloth, $29.50; paper, $12.95. 
Gregory Leyh 2 
If a play is any good, any act of it, any scene of it, any character of it, can be 
interpreted fifteen different ways, each one as good as the other .... The script itself 
is merely the raw material on which a group of collaborators have got to work. It is 
not the finished article. That idea is merely the invention, for the most basely mate-
rialistic reasons, of literary professors. 
Tyrone Guthrie 
This is a time of political and intellectual ferment in constitu-
tional theory. Several impressive books arguing for one or another 
preferred theory of constitutional jurisprudence have recently 
caught our attention. Increasingly, also, constitutional scholars are 
turning to philosophy for clarification of the central issues in consti-
tutional interpretation. The general effort to forge a conscious 
I. Professor of Political Science, University of Georgia. 
2. Assistant Professor of Political Science, lllinois Wesleyan University. I would like 
to thank Karen Gervais for her comments on an earlier draft. 
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merger between contemporary philosophy and modem jurispru-
dence is altogether commendable. 
In this wide-ranging book, Professor Carter sets out to survey 
recent constitutional scholarship in light of what he considers to be 
a consensus among contemporary philosophers. Carter launches a 
critique of a dozen or so modem constitutional theorists predicated 
on his understanding of this consensus. The philosophical consen-
sus itself turns out to revolve around hermeneutics. Drawing inspi-
ration from sentiments such as that expressed above by Tyrone 
Guthrie, Carter sees Supreme Court decisionmaking in constitu-
tional cases as a kind of "play" or "performance," which is best 
evaluated according to the "fit" the Court manages to achieve given 
the legal, political, and artistic materials with which it must work. 
Carter describes the current state of constitutional theory as 
one of paradox. In his view, 
Modern jurisprudence is in a bind. The century of Western social philosophy that 
has included American pragmatism, German hermeneutics, and French decon-
struction has severely weakened the building blocks of jurisprudence. The determi-
nateness of legal texts, the intelligibility of the intent or the goals of lawgivers, and 
the attainability of a national consensus about fundamental political values all ap-
pear as naive pipedreams. 
According to Carter, "the modem philosophical consensus" is 
so clear and so powerful that constitutional theory can no longer 
afford to ignore it.3 At the very core of this "modem philosophical 
consensus" is the absence of an epistemic rock on which to ground 
our knowledge of the world. Under these conditions meaning is 
said to be set adrift. Carter describes the lack of an objective foot-
ing from which to determine meaning as a genuine constitutional 
dilemma. Attempts to escape the dilemma by grounding constitu-
tional meaning in the four comers of the document, in the intent of 
the framers, in a theory of legal precedent, or in a normative polit-
ical theory are valiant but ultimately ineffectual efforts to locate 
meaning where in principle it cannot be found. These efforts repre-
sent a stubborn refusal to learn what "the modem philosophical 
consensus" has to teach us. What is to be done? 
The standard for evaluating the Court is thus not the intellectual proof of the right-
ness of one answer as against all others. There may be fifteen different right ways to 
perform Hamlet and the equal protection clause as well. The search for the one 
proper answer has brought jurisprudence to its present dead end. Rather, we 
3. In Carter's words, "I assume without extended argument that the modern philo-
sophical consensus is so broad and, within current frames of reference, so powerful, that 
nothing can be gained by ignoring it or challenging it." One wonders, however, if something 
might not have been gained by more carefully explaining "it." 
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should evaluate the quality of a legal performance, using the same aesthetic guides 
we use to judge theatrical performances and other artistic acts. 
Following a general discussion of the dilemma currently facing 
constitutional theorists and a quick review (designed to "bring nov-
ices up to the speed at which this book travels), Carter embarks on 
a critical analysis of several recent contributions to constitutional 
law. This section of the book includes an examination of 
"preservatism, "4 a designation that embraces the writings of Walter 
Berns, Gary McDowell, John Agresto, Christopher Wolfe, and 
Robert Bork. Next Carter undertakes to show the inadequacies of 
"political alternatives to interpretivism." Among those said to offer 
constitutional theories of this kind are Herbert Wechsler, Alexander 
Bickel, Jesse Choper, John Hart Ely, and Michael J. Perry. Finally, 
Carter assesses the adequacy of "normative alternatives to interpre-
tivism" by discussing briefly the work of John Rawls, Ronald 
Dworkin, Walter F. Murphy, and the Critical Legal Studies move-
ment. The book's final two chapters purport to identify and defend 
a "jurisprudence of performance." 
Carter thinks that preservatism-which is the view "that the 
Constitution, if only we would treat it as a legal document, does 
yield demonstrably correct legal conclusions to litigated cases" -is 
the least serious contender among the proposals for resolving the 
constitutional dilemma. With characteristic bravado, he says that 
"[t]he case for constitutional interpretation bound strictly to text 
and history is only slightly stronger than the case for the proposi-
tion that we inhabit a flat earth." The basis for this unflattering 
appraisal of originalist constitutional theory is provided by modem 
philosophy: "[n]o branch of contemporary scholarship seem [sic] 
more obviously, sometimes ludicrously, out of touch with the main-
stream of modem political and social philosophy" (p. 42).s In the 
4. Carter prefers "preservatism" to either "interpretivism" or "originalism." The lat-
ter terms, in his view, are misleading. 
"lnterpretivism" takes for granted the proposition that the justices could interpret if 
they wished. It criticizes them for failing to choose this option, which misleads 
because the justices do not have this option in the first place. "Originalism" also 
misleads, both because it implies that constitutional clauses had original meanings 
with reference to contemporary constitutional issues and because I, at least, associ-
ate originality with "creativity," something originalists condemn. 
Originalists, of course, are not opposed to creativity as such. They oppose judicial creativity 
when it extends beyond legitimate constitutional authority. 
5. It is not clear that Professor Carter speaks with much authority about what is in the 
mainstream of political and social philosophy. In a recent article, for example, he urges 
readers seeking "an accessible introduction to this philosophical mainstream," to read Rich-
ard Bernstein's Beyond Objectivism and Relativism. Bernstein's book is a superb study of the 
work of Gadamer, Rorty, Habermas, and Arendt. As good as this book is, I doubt that it is 
fair to describe it as "mainstream." See Carter, "Die Meistersinger von Nurnberg" & the 
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book's first extended discussion of philosophy's potential contribu-
tion to jurisprudence, Carter argues that the presuppositions of 
preservatism are fatally inconsistent with "modern theories of inter-
pretation itself-hermeneutics." 
The flaw in preservatism seems to be its implicit commitment 
to an objectivist conception of truth. Preservatism is presented as 
presupposing that truth is a property of the text or of its immediate 
historical context. The discovery of constitutional truth requires 
only a careful study of the text and its immediate history. This ob-
jectivist conception of truth is exploded by hermeneutics. For 
Carter informs readers that "recent members of the German school 
(Mannheim, Wittgenstein, Gadamer, and Habermas ... )" have 
taught us that "what you or I believe is real depends not on realities 
or truths 'out there' but on the nature of the social communications, 
the conversations about reality, that we experience." In short, 
Carter tells us that we cannot ever really recover the historical hori-
zons of the founding period. This judgment is partly attributed to 
the hermeneutical insight that "[w]hat we know from our own ex-
perience is all we can ever know." Believers in preservatism have 
apparently not yet been awakened by the light of hermeneutics. 
Political alternatives to interpretivism share a preoccupation 
with the justification of judicial review. Advocates of this way out 
of the constitutional dilemma seek to present a rationale for the le-
gitimacy of judicial review. When, they ask, is it legitimate for the 
Court to make policy? Carter regards this preoccupation as "just as 
fruitless as the preoccupation with preservatism, and ultimately for 
the same reasons." The legitimacy problem, moreover, "is the most 
overrated problem in social philosophy." These comments notwith-
standing, Carter finds Michael Perry's nonoriginalism particularly 
appealing. He notes, for example, that 
Perry's position is close to my own. If he had proceeded to define and illustrate the 
standards by which we might assess how well or badly the Court deepens our moral 
understanding in specific cases, I might not have bothered to write this book. In· 
stead, Perry reverts to the standard forms of arguments of his community of legal 
scholars: the preoccupation with political legitimacy and the demonstration, de-
spite what he has just written, that his position possesses the greatest logical ele-
gance of them all. 
Perry's nonoriginalism comes up short both because it "operates on 
such a high level of abstraction" and because of "his overly simple 
distinction between interpretive and noninterpretive review." Once 
again, the claim is put forth that "the hermeneutic philosophers" 
United States Supreme Court: Aesthetic Theory in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 18 POLITY 
273 n.2 (1985). 
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have added to (clouded?) our understanding of interpretation to 
such a degree that the sharp distinction between originalism and 
nonoriginalism-a peg on which Perry hangs his hat--can no 
longer be maintained. 
Carter is more generous in his treatment of normative alterna-
tives to interpretivism. This is partly due to his view that 
"[c]onstitutionallawmaking correctly done makes statements about 
the normative character of the polity. It is a struggle to identify 
what sort of a community the United States is and what it might 
become." Thus Carter is sympathetic with a constitutional jurispru-
dence that yields a central place to normative theory. Normative 
theories, however, are valid only insofar as they are consistent with 
the claims about knowledge and truth expressed by the alleged 
"modern philosophical" consensus." Following a brief analysis of 
Ronald Dworkin's jurisprudence, including a review of the pointed 
exchange between Dworkin and Stanley Fish over objectivity in in-
terpretation, Carter predictably lowers the hermeneutical boom: 
"Dworkin's distinction between explaining and changing must as-
sume that there is a concrete, indisputable, and immutable essence 
in the text itself. This holding runs Dworkin directly into the wall 
of postpositivist philosophy." 
Carter does not find contemporary constitutional jurisprudence 
completely wanting. He is attracted by the normative vision and 
poetic style of Walter F. Murphy.6 More importantly, the Critical 
Legal Studies movement offers a ray of light in what otherwise ap-
pears as a sea of constitutional darkness. Part of the appeal of CLS 
lies in its opposition to objectivism, convention, and authority. 
Critical legal theory is chiefly concerned with politics. Carter sug-
gests that "[i]ts attentiveness to political experience ... allows it to 
develop aesthetically appealing legal theories." Indeed, we find in 
the Critical Legal Studies movement the intellectual precursor of 
the aesthetic model of jurisprudence Carter outlines in the book's 
closing chapters. 
Readers hoping to find a detailed presentation of Carter's "ju-
risprudence of performance" will be disappointed. Carter is content 
to offer a sketch of his aesthetic approach along with some sugges-
tive remarks. According to Carter, constitutional lawmaking is 
fundamentally aesthetic insofar as the lawmaker seeks to construct 
a normative vision that harmonizes the relevant political and legal 
facts. The Court works with raw disputes and actual political expe-
6. Carter explains: "I suspect my preference for Murphy's more descriptive and po-
etic style has a great deal to do with my training in, and professional identity with, political 
science." 
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rience rather than with abstract theories or objective truths. It 
seeks to mold these raw political facts into a coherent whole in a 
way persuasive to its audience. In Carter's words, 
A performance is aesthetically good because it persuades us that acts of ordering the 
chaos are doable and meaningful. This is why the essence of a good performance is 
that the elements of the vision it creates appear to us to be well-ordered or well-
fitted together. Hence a majority and a dissenting opinion in the same case may 
both be constitutionally good if both create different but well-ordered political 
visions. 
The "goodness" of constitutional opinions, that is, their nor-
mative value for our community, is a function of the way they 
meaningfully order our political experience for us. Good constitu-
tional opinions-like good art-orders our reality in meaningful 
ways. Carter submits Sweatt v. Painter 1 as an illustration. In 
Carter's judgment, Chief Justice Vinson's opinion 
fits together the equal protection clause, precedents, the particular facts of the fund-
ing of legal education in Texas in 1946, the social facts about the nature of legal 
practice, and the fundamental norm of equality of opportunity. But it does not do 
so as a purely logical matter. It is a typical example of practical legal reasoning. 
Other fits reaching the opposite conclusion might have worked. For me, at least, 
this fit works because it builds directly on its reading of the experiences of citizens 
in a world of political power. It moralizes power. Like Lyndon Johnson's southern 
speeches in 1960, it claimed to harmonize a world that the members of its audi-
ence-law school administrators and black citizens of Texas in this case-shared. 
As noted in the introduction, I share Carter's enthusiasm for 
exploring the intersections between constitutional lawmaking and 
hermeneutics. Indeed, the book's central contribution is in its un-
swerving focus on the capacity of philosophy to clarify and poten-
tially dissolve problems besetting constitutional theory. I shall 
return to this theme in the next section. 
Unfortunately Carter's understanding and presentation of the 
relevant philosophical literature is often imprecise, misleading, ex-
aggerated, or just plain wrong. It was once said that political scien-
tists are always "the last to hear the war news from the 
philosophical front." 8 Carter has heard some interesting news re-
cently, but he hasn't understood it very well. 
This would not be so serious were it not for the centrality of 
the "modern philosophical consensus" in Carter's argument. To 
take one example, Carter observes that "[i]n the late twentieth cen-
tury a consensus in social philosophy and social science" has devel-
7. 339 U.S. 629 (1950). 
8. Terence Ball, in a review of M. SHAPIRO, LANGUAGE AND POLITICAL UNDER-
STANDING: THE POLITICS OF DISCURSIVE PRACTICES, in 76 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 735 
(1982). 
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oped which holds that "what you or I believe is real depends not on 
realities or truths 'out there' but on the nature of the social commu-
nications, the conversations about reality, that we experience." 
This hermeneutic consensus is "the position that nothing is know-
able, that everything is relative and recreated moment by 
moment."9 
Here and elsewhere Carter's characterization of contemporary 
social philosophy might lead one to the false belief that realism, viz., 
the view that the world exists independently of our minds, is no 
longer taken seriously among philosophers. Realism, though per-
haps not held in high esteem by all philosophers (what is?), is surely 
not subject to the universal rejection implied by Carter's claim. If 
philosophical realism is dead, one need only consult some of the 
writings of Hilary Putnam for proof that as far as philosophical 
doctrines are concerned, there is life after death.w And while it is 
true to point out that twentieth century philosophers generally 
agree that individual perceptions play a necessary role in the consti-
tution of knowledge, it is flatly misleading to say that "all under-
standing is personal." Quite the contrary, at least according to the 
contemporary social philosophers who regard shared languages or 
shared traditions as generative of truth (a group which includes 
Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas, Macintyre, and 
Kuhn). The "modem philosophical consensus" which undergirds 
Carter's critique of contemporary constitutional scholarship is a 
considerably more complicated affair than he lets on. In effect, 
Carter illicitly seizes the authority of a "philosophical consensus" 
that is nowhere to be found. 
Carter's philosophical confusions are most apparent as he dis-
cusses hermeneutics. Here his commentary is excessively depen-
dent on secondary materials. He explains his heavy debt to Richard 
Bernstein's excellent book, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism, by 
observing that "what is in the original [is] sometimes obscure." Ob-
scure or not, Carter has not done the philosophical homework nee-
9. Elsewhere Carter says that "I do not challenge the conclusions of modern linguis-
tics, hermeneutics, and perceptual psychology. 'Truth,' defined as it is by personal experi-
ence, varies according to each of our separate and unique experiences. Truth is private .... 
To an unprecedented degree, people make and live in different worlds." 
10. H. PUTNAM, MEANING AND THE MORAL SciENCES (1978), and REASON, TRUTH 
AND HISTORY (1981). See also Lilla, On Goodman, Putnam, and Rorty: The Return to the 
"Given," 51 PARTISAN REV. 220 (1984). 
And consider the following statement by Anthony Kenny in a review ofT. NAGEL, THE 
VIEW FROM NowHERE. After describing Nagel as standing "in the mainstream of the philo-
sophical tradition," Kenny writes that "Mr. Nagel defends realism in epistemology and eth-
ics: the world is independent of our minds, and we need detachment from self to make room 
for the claims of impersonal values," New York Times Book Rev., Feb. 23, 1986, at 14. 
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essary to persuade readers that his claims concerning the "modem 
philosophical consensus," and especially concerning hermeneutics, 
are valid. Indeed, many of these claims are suspect, others are sim-
ply false. 
For example, he repeatedly characterizes hermeneutics as lim-
iting knowledge to what individuals can learn from their own per-
sonal experiences: "[W]hat we know from our own experience is all 
we can ever know." Gadamer is wrongly said to regard under-
standing as that which occurs through a "mediation in the mind of 
the interpreter." From this Carter concludes that the ways different 
Justices come to understand the issues of a case "are necessarily 
personal." It is even possible that the Justices "lack ... a common 
starting point" for understanding. All of this culminates in the 
epistemological howler--offered in the name of hermeneutics-that 
"[t]ruth is private." 
But for Gadamer it is our shared traditions and common lan-
guage that serve as vehicles for mediating past and present. These 
are part of our historical experience, they are not personal. Hence 
to suppose the Court lacked "a common starting point" is to falsely 
suppose the Justices lack common traditions and historical exper-
iences. When Carter suggests that "[h]ermeneutic appreciation re-
quires scholars to try to see the world independently from and 
liberated from any conventional frameworks,"'' he turns the truth 
squarely on its head. For on Gadamer's account it is only through 
conventional language and shared frameworks that the world can 
be construed at all. As David Ingram observes, "Gadamer argues 
that human understanding is not to be conceived as an act of psy-
chological transposition, but is rather like a conversation in which a 
shared understanding (agreement) is reached that resists reduction 
to either of the interlocuters' privileged intentions."I2 
Part of Carter's misunderstanding of hermeneutics is due to his 
inability to extricate himself from the view-a view of which he is 
critical-that unless we can ground truth claims in an objective re-
ality, we are left floating in an epistemological sea without any oars. 
Bernstein characterizes this perspective as the "Either/Or. Either 
there is a universal, objective moral law, or the concept of morality 
II. Carter continues this mistaken line of interpretation when, during a summary of 
what is to be learned from "modem hermeneutic thought," he observes that "[t]he interpreter 
cannot transcend the present, cannot bring past and present together into a higher fusion." 
Gadamer is committed to the idea that interpreters seek a fusion of horizons between past 
and present. 
12. David Ingram, "Hermeneutics and Truth," in HERMENEUTICS AND PRAXIS 41 (R. 
Hollinger ed. 1985). 
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is groundless and vacuous."l3 As we've seen, Carter is highly criti-
cal of the objectivist side of this distinction. Yet if there are "fifteen 
different ways to perform ... the equal protection clause," perhaps 
Carter too readily accepts the lack of any moral or legal standards 
whatsoever. Following Gadamer, Bernstein maintains that the 
"Either/Or" is a misleading characterization of the available op-
tions. Philosophical hermeneutics offers a critique of objectivism 
without lapsing into the subjectivism that afflicts Carter's concep-
tion of truth. "In effect," writes Bernstein, 
I am suggesting that Gadamer is appealing to a concept of truth that (pragmatically 
speaking) amounts to what can be argumentatively validated by the community of 
interpreters who open themselves to what tradition "says to us." This does not 
mean that there is some transcendental or a historical perspective from which we 
can evaluate competing claims to truth. We judge and evaluate such claims by the 
standards and practices that have been hammered out in the course of history.14 
The standards for evaluating truth claims involve an appeal to what 
communities have come to regard as persuasive reasons and argu-
ments. These standards are identifiable for any given community. 
Carter, however, finds all of this too constraining on the need to 
"perform." Hence he tells readers that truth, like justice, "exists in 
the making ... How much you accept [of this book] depends on 
your own beliefs and experiences." 
It is useful to remember that Gadamer's philosophical herme-
neutics purports to operate on an ontological plane. It is not a de-
sign for methodology. In Gadamer's own words, his aim is to 
identify "not what we do or what we ought to do [in interpretation], 
but what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing."1s 
Thus it is a mistake to see philosophical hermeneutics strictly in 
terms of the rules or procedures appropriate for the interpretation 
of texts. What philosophical hermeneutics offers is a standard for 
evaluating all methodological practices whose aim is the under-
standing of texts. Carter fails to see this basic point. Hence one 
finds in his book oxymoronic phrases such as "the methodology of 
hermeneutic inquiry." 
Finally, Carter's discussion of the theoretical basis for his pre-
ferred aesthetic model of jurisprudence is undeveloped and incom-
plete. Beyond a few references to the work of Nelson Goodman, 
readers find very little in the way of careful philosophical discussion 
of aesthetics and its relationship to law. The book's impressions of 
aesthetics lack conceptual bite and explanatory power. 
13. R. BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM 13 (1983). 
14. R. BERNSTEIN, supra note 13, at 154. 
15. H. GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD at xvi (1982). 
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Philosophical hermeneutics is the study of the conditions of all 
human understanding. Gadamer believes that juridical or legal her-
meneutics supplies the best model for identifying these conditions.I6 
The contribution of philosophical hermeneutics to constitutional in-
terpretation lies in its power to reveal the philosophical implications 
of the practical activity of interpreting legal texts. What constitu-
tional theory needs at the present time is not more knowledge of the 
framers' intentions, or the Constitution's original meaning, or thin 
analogies with aesthetic theories, but a self-critical examination of 
the underlying premises of prevailing conceptions of interpretation 
itself. Philosophical hermeneutics invites us to begin this task. 
Two aspects of philosophical hermeneutics seem especially use-
ful for constitutional jurisprudence. First, Gadamer emphasizes the 
role of language in understanding and reminds us to be keenly 
aware of the historical structures constitutive of all knowledge. Sec-
ond, historical knowledge is dependent on our prejudgments and 
preconceptions which serve as critical windows to the past. Inter-
pretive theories designed to suppress these prejudgments miscon-
ceive of the character of interpretation. 
It is now almost a cliche to point out that twentieth-century 
philosophy has taken a linguistic or interpretive turn.I7 Language is 
foundational to the way we act, know, and interpret. Yet language 
has no intrinsic properties capable of yielding meaning. Meaning is 
a function of the way words are used. Is Determining the meaning 
of a text, therefore, is "a messy business of guesswork predicated on 
practical knowledge of language, conventions, and the situations in 
which they operate."I9 The virtue of Gadamer's philosophical her-
meneutics is that it offers a powerful account of the role of lan-
guage, conventions, and tradition in understanding, and thus serves 
as a philosophical observation point from which to examine the 
practical task of constitutional interpretation. 
16. Legal hermeneutics is able to point out what the real procedure of the human 
sciences is. Here we have the model for the relationship between past and present 
that we are seeking. The judge who adapts the transmitted law to the needs of the 
present is undoubtedly seeking to perform a practical task, but his interpretation of 
the law is by no means on that account an arbitrary re-interpretation. Here again, 
to understand and to interpret means to discover and recognize a valid meaning. 
He seeks to discover the "legal idea" of a law by linking it with the present. 
H. GADAMER, supra note 15, at 292-93. 
17. See Introduction, in B. FLATHMAN, CONCEPTS IN SOCIAL AND POLITICAL PHILOS-
OPHY (1973); and F. DALLMAYR, LANGUAGE AND POLITICS: WHY DOES LANGUAGE MAT-
TER TO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY? (1984). 
18. Gerald Graff observes that "the meaning of an utterance isn't a function of the 
words themselves or even of the sentences, but of the use to which the words and sentences 
are put to the speakers and writers." Graff, "Keep Off the Grass, " "Drop Dead, "and Other 
Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REV. 407 (1982). 
19. /d. at 410. 
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Gadamer illustrates what occurs as we seek to understand his-
torical texts through the suggestive example of translation. The aim 
of translation is not merely to reproduce meanings discovered in 
historically remote books. The translator has the additional obliga-
tion of making textual messages meaningful to those for whom he is 
translating: 
Here the translator must translate the meaning to be understood into the con-
text in which the other speaker lives. This does not, of course, mean that he is at 
liberty to falsify the meaning of what the other person says. Rather, the meaning 
must be preserved, but since it must be understood within a new linguistic world, it 
must be expressed within it in a new way. 
[T]he translator must respect the character of his own language, into which he is 
translating, while still recognizing the value of the alien, even antagonistic character 
of the text and its expression. 20 
Accordingly, constitutional hermeneutics conceives of inter-
pretation as the attempt to translate meaning from an older linguis-
tic world into terms intelligible in the present. It provides what 
constitutional theory presently lacks: a theory of conceptual 
change. The important political and moral terms in the Constitu-
tion, terms such as "due process," "cruel and unusual," "freedom 
of speech," and others are, like all language, vulnerable to change. 
How is such conceptual change to be understood? In what ways are 
these changes not merely things to be described, but themselves 
constitutive of political and legal practice? What are the outer pa-
rameters that serve to limit conceptual change? These are questions 
at the heart of a jurisprudence that is sensitive to the linguistic con-
stitution of its object. Philosophical hermeneutics offers one possi-
ble set of answers to these key questions. 
Truth and Method rehabilitates the concept of prejudice. Prej-
udice serves as an enabling instrument for the acquisition of histori-
cal meaning. Here, "prejudice" refers to our prejudgments and 
preconceptions. No text simply sits before us and announces its 
meaning. Readers must first pose questions to the text and its tradi-
tion, and must be conscious of the ways a text may be faithfully 
applied before any meaning can be construed. These questions, as-
pects of tradition, and possible forms of application comprise our 
prejudice. Without prejudice we could hardly understand at all.21 
20. H. GADAMER, supra note 15, at 346, 348-49. 
2 I. Thus Gadamer: 
This is the point at which the attempt to arrive at an historical hermeneutics has to 
start its critique. The overcoming of all prejudices, this global demand of the en-
lightenment, will prove to be itself a prejudice, the removal of which opens the way 
to an appropriate understanding of our finitude, which dominates not only our hu-
manity, but also our historical consciousness. /d. at 244. 
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Gadamer argues that historical knowledge is possible only by "see-
ing the past in its continuity with the present."22 Prejudice enables 
us to maintain our hallowed constitutional tradition. 
The role of prejudice in understanding is illustrated by legal 
interpretation. A jurist's purpose in interpretation is to validate the 
meaning of the law by applying it to the concrete present repre-
sented by the case at hand. Judicial interpretation does not seek 
meaning for its own sake, but out of an interest in adjudicating ac-
tual disputes. In constitutional hermeneutics interpretation is not 
one thing and application another.23 The facts of a case are partly 
constitutive of the interpretation rendered. That is, facts and dis-
putes in law serve as guideposts for a judge's account of constitu-
tional meaning. In this way, legal hermeneutics illustrates the 
constitutive character of present conditions, including prejudices, 
on our reconstructions of the past. 
In sum, philosophical hermeneutics suggests that a full appre-
ciation of constitutional meaning requires an awareness of our 
prejudices and a sensitivity to the mutable nature of the language 
through which the text makes its appearance. In Gadamer's idiom, 
we might say that the aim of constitutional interpretation is to 
achieve a "fusion of horizons" between past and present. That is, 
we seek to fuse the historical horizon of the text with the historical 
horizon of the concrete present into which we must always translate 
its meaning. 
Contemporary philosophy, notably philosophical hermeneu-
tics, does indeed have something valuable to offer students of consti-
tutional law. Professor Carter clearly agrees. Yet his attempt to 
deploy philosophy against constitutional theory misfires for the rea-
sons offered above. In addition, Carter's argument for an aesthetic 
jurisprudence is superficial and unsupported by a genuine under-
standing of the philosophical literature on which it claims to rest. 
There is a useful lesson to be learned here. The lesson is that 
although philosophy should be seen as a valuable resource for con-
stitutional theory, philosophy cannot provide answers to all of the 
most intractable problems in law. A sense of humility about the 
uses of philosophy is appropriate. Such humility is entirely absent 
from the book under review. 
Referring to the various disciplines that interpret texts, David 
Hoy has perceptively noted that "hermeneutics must be modest 
about what it can do for the practical disciplines themselves .... 
22. /d. at 292. 
23. Gadamer thinks that the hermeneutical distinction between establishing an original 
meaning and applying that meaning ''is a legally untenable fiction." /d. at 291. 
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[P]hilosophical hermeneutics may try to clarify these debates about 
method, but it should not expect to lead to a total change in the 
empirical practices of the discipline."24 Philosophical hermeneutics 
may be of some value to those disciplines like constitutional theory 
whose thinking about interpretation is somewhat muddled. The 
value of philosophical hermeneutics is in its ability to root out in-
consistencies and expose the lacunae in prevailing theories of consti-
tutional interpretation. Beyond that a constitutional hermeneutics 
has little to offer constitutional lawyers. To suppose that contempo-
rary philosophy might offer us an "exit from the bind" we presently 
find ourselves in, a bind which is in important respects politically 
and historically determined, is to make both a political and a philo-
sophical mistake. 
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